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Abstract
The history of debt relief is now particularly long, the associated costs are soar-
ing and the outcomes are at least uncertain. This paper reviews and provides new
evidence on the effects of recent debt relief programs on different macroeconomic
indicators in developing countries, focusing on the Highly Indebted Poor Countries.
Besides, the relationship between debt relief and institutional change is investigated
to assess whether donors are moving towards and ex-post governance conditionality.
Results show that debt relief is only weakly associated with subsequent improve-
ments in economic performance but it is correlated with increasing domestic debt
in HIPCs, undermining the positive achievements in reducing external debt service.
Finally, there is evidence that donors are moving towards a more sensible allocation
of debt forgiveness, rewarding countries with better policies and institutions.
Keywords: HIPC, Debt Relief, Institutions.
JEL Classification: C33, F34, H63, O11
1 Introduction
The current debt crisis in the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) is a long
lasting phenomenon started in the seventies and due to increasing bilateral loans
and concessional lending, to the lack of macroeconomic adjustments and structural
reforms in poor countries, and to a number of exogenous domestic and international
shocks that hindered economic growth in HIPCs. As a result of these adverse sce-
nario, these countries started accumulating external debt in the seventies and, more
intensively, in the following decade, reaching extreme ratios of debt over GDP and
exports by mid-nineties (Figure 1). At the beginning of the seventies HIPCs had,
on average, a level of external debt equal to total exports and to around a fourth
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search group (MoFiR) and Centre for Macroeconomic and Finance Research (CeMaFiR). E-mail:
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Figure 1: External Debt in HIPCs
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Source: World Development Indicators 2008 (World Bank, 2008).
of gross domestic product. By the end of the eighties, the stock of debt became
equal to the annual GDP and to more than five times exports, notwithstanding the
extensive use of non-concessional flow reschedulings granted by the the informal
group of official creditor (Paris Club). The increasing external debt was seen as
unsustainable and determined a number of debt relief initiatives that were intro-
duced during the late 1980s and the 1990s (Toronto, London, Naples and Lyon
terms), according to which bilateral donors agreed on rescheduling on concessional
terms (see Daseking and Powell, 1999, for a detailed discussion of the history of
debt relief). Nevertheless, the stock of external debt kept growing and, at its peak,
the level of external debt in the whole sample of HIPCs reached 152 per cent of
GDP (in 1994) and 663 per cent of exports (in 1993). Thereafter, it started a steep
decline in debt ratios, especially in the last five years. Thanks to the Highly In-
debted Poor Country Initiative launched by the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund in 1996 and enhanced in 1999, the average external debt to GDP
ratio at 45 per cent and the ratio over exports at 150 per cent, the threshold which
was identified as the sustainable level of debt under the HIPC Initiative. Finally,
in 2005, donors pledged to cancel the whole debt held by the International De-
velopment Association of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the
African Development Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank of the coun-
tries that have reached the completion point under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.
Notwithstanding this recent decline in debt ratios, the evidence on the effective-
ness of debt relief in enhancing economic growth and reducing poverty is broadly
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inconclusive. Depetris Chauvin and Kraay (2005) show that the $100 billion in debt
relief granted by donors to low-income countries between 1989 and 2003 had a very
limited effect on public spending, investment and growth in recipient countries.
Generally, the applied development literature focused on the consequences of
external debt on the real economies, firstly following the Latin-American debt crisis
of the eighties, and than being reinvigorated by the Highly Indebted Poor Countries
Initiative coordinated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in
1996.
The theoretical framework is based on the debt overhang hypothesis (Krugman,
1988; Sachs, 1989), which predicts that higher debt is detrimental to economic
growth since it discourages investments. In presence of debt overhang, excess debt
acts as a distortionary tax, given that agents assume that a share of future out-
put will be used to repay creditors and therefore decrease or postpone investment,
hindering economic growth. However, this situation is not likely to be the case
in the current debt crisis, given that HIPCs receive net positive resource inflows
and borrow from official creditors (World Bank’s IDA and IMF’s PRGF) which are
neither profit maximizers nor risk neutral, so that they are not scared off by the
excessive stock of existing debt and keep on lending at a high degree of concession-
ality. Koeda (2008) adapts the debt overhang argument to the specific experience
of low-income countries developing a simple model in which the interest rate on
loans depends on debtor country’s income being below or above an income cutoff.
Being trapped in a debt overhang is a function of the initial stock of debt and of
country’s total factor productivity, with highly indebted countries having a strong
incentive to accumulate concessional debt and allocate resources to consumption
rather than investment, stagnating below the cutoff so that they could keep on
borrowing at a concessional rate, becoming aid dependent. One implication of this
model is that debt relief has to be a one-time treatment in order to be effective
in helping countries to achieve growth. If this is not the case, debtors still have
the incentive to stagnate around the cutoff because they anticipate that they will
receive future debt relief according to the same eligibility criteria.
The empirical validation of the presence of debt overhang in poor countries is
ambiguous. Some earlier paper identified a non-linear relationship between exter-
nal debt and growth (the so-called Debt Laffer curve), supporting debt reduction
policies (Elbadawi, Ndulu and Ndung’u, 1997; Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci, 2002;
Clements, Bhattacharya and Nguyen, 2003). More recent studies only partially
confirm the debt overhang effect, since there is evidence of a sort of debt irrele-
vance zone beyond a debt threshold (Cordella, Ricci and Ruiz-Arranz, 2005) and
also of a spurious relationship driven by country-specific factors jointly determining
low growth rates and high debts (Imbs and Ranciere, 2005). In particular, insti-
tutional factors drive the debt-growth relationship and debt overhang is effective
exclusively in countries with sound institutions (Presbitero, 2008). Moreover, these
studies identifies the direct effect of large debt on economic growth, generally disen-
tangling between its impact on capital accumulation and total factor productivity
(Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci, 2004). Other possible consequences on the economy,
such as social and health expenditures, and attractiveness to foreign investors are
generally not considered.
The crowding out of investment due to debt service payments represent a sec-
ond channel through which large debts could impinge on economic growth. The
empirical literature on this effect is not conclusive. According to some authors
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(Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci, 2002; Cordella, Ricci and Ruiz-Arranz, 2005), debt
service is not detrimental for economic growth, given that HIPCs actually receive
positive inflows of resources. By contrast, others (Cohen, 1993; Chowdhury, 2004;
Hansen, 2004; Loxley and Sackey, 2008) corroborate the adverse impact of debt
service obligations, even if its impact might be limited to investment (Presbitero,
2006) and its magnitude on GDP growth is small (Clements, Bhattacharya and
Nguyen, 2003).
Hence, according to the existing evidence, there might be a positive effect of
debt relief on subsequent economic growth rates, at least in countries with good
institutions. Nevertheless, the theoretical arguments are not so straightforward and
debt relief does not necessarily imply an improvement in recipients’ economic and
social indicators. The rationale of a poor performance of debt relief has to do with
debt relief being an alternative source, but not a perfect substitute, of foreign aid.
On the one hand, debt relief, similarly to foreign aid, generate a state of aid de-
pendence in debtor countries, which could undermine institutional quality by weak-
ening and distorting political accountability, encouraging corruption, fomenting
conflict over control of aid funds, siphoning off scarce talent from the bureaucracy,
and alleviating pressures to reform inefficient policies and institutions (Knack, 2001;
Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle, 2006; Wood, 2008)1.
On the other hand, differently from foreign aid, debt relief does not consists in
a direct inflow of resources but in a reduction of the fiscal expenditures through a
decline in debt service payments. This could reduce the negative effects of foreign
aid due to the exchange rate overvaluation (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005) and
to rent-seeking behaviors which could generate a sort of aid curse similar to the
natural resource curse (Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2008).
Besides, debt relief does not necessarily provide additional resources to recipient
countries: when debt cancelation concerns debts that were not being serviced,
it does not free resources with respect to a situation without debt relief. Even
when debt service payments actually decrease, debt relief has a minimal impact on
HIPCs’ net resource transfers, which are largely driven by net lending and grants
(Arslanalp and Henry, 2006), consistent with the literature which does not find a
robust evidence of the crowding out effect.
A further reason why debt relief could be ineffective is that it is not considered
as a positive signal of countries undertaking structural reforms and changing their
policies according to debt reduction initiatives. On the contrary, it seems that
investors interpreted debt relief as a signal for countries that, given their large
external debt, are likely to have a high (and stable over time) discount rate against
the future: this would mean that governments will keep on overborrowing and
trading off consumption today versus consumption tomorrow, heavily taxing the
private sector and discouraging investors (Easterly, 2002).
Finally, it is reasonable to assume that debt relief would become more effective
with time, since governments and International Financial Institutions approach to
1Contrary to this point, Kanbur (2000) argues that debt relief could actually reduce aid dependence
especially because of the less energy, time and human capital wasted in debt rescheduling and negotiations
with donors to keep a resource inflows large enough to repay debt obligations. Nevertheless, HIPC debt
relief is not a sort of arm’s length lending, given the number of conditions to be met under the HIPC
Initiative. Besides, even if time and effort committed by public officials to debt management could be
redeployed in more productive areas after debt relief, such benefits would not become evident for many
years (Moss, 2006).
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debt relief is driven by learning by doing, as testified by the incremental improve-
ments in the HIPC Initiative (i.e. from the original to the enhanced HIPC and
finally to the MDRI) and in the debt sustainability framework (Group, 2006).
Therefore, debt relief effectiveness could be undermined by its limited impact
on government budget, its negative signalling effect and by worsening institutional
quality. The first point should be the most effective one, given that a significant
share of debt relief concerns debt which were not likely to be serviced anyway. The
second explanation is consistent with the former, given that investors would have
probably already discounted the write-off of the debt actually forgiven and, there-
fore, they are not likely to change their strategies because of a formal debt relief
announcement. Finally, the last point is the most critical: firstly, one should vali-
date the link between debt relief and institutional quality and, only after that, one
could investigate whether worsening institutions are another element undermining
debt relief effectiveness. Only if these two hypothesis are confirmed one could argue
that the larger is debt relief’s share in government revenues, the lower the incentives
to invest in effective public institutions.
With respect to the last point, there is a vast literature on aid allocation show-
ing how foreign aid mainly responds to political incentives (Alesina and Dollar,
2000), even if recent trends go in the direction of increasing selectivity in terms of
democracy and rule of law (Dollar and Levin, 2006). By contrast, the choice of
granting debt relief received a limited attention, even if some authors look at the
determinants of debt relief in order to assess what drives donors’ behavior (Neu-
mayer, 2002; Freytag and Pehnelt, 2008). One contribution of the paper aims at
filling this gap estimating a two-stage model of debt relief to identify how different
factors affect the likelihood of receiving debt relief and the amount of debt actu-
ally forgiven. With respect to the literature, this paper contributes updating the
analysis of Neumayer (2002) still controlling also for recipients’ needs and explicitly
focusing on HIPCs, in order to test whether HIPC relief is targeting countries more
in need and better governed. Moreover, we measure the policy and institutional
framework using (amongst other indicators) the overall CPIA score, on which the
World Bank lending policies are based. This represents an advantage in the sense
that we can better identify by the ex-post evaluation of creditors’ behavior whether
donors moved towards consistent lending policies, rewarding countries with better
policies and sounder institutions and eventually improving debt relief effectiveness.
Once assessed how debt relief is allocated by donors, we focus on its effective-
ness. A recent strand of literature explicitly addresses the outcomes of actual debt
relief on growth and investment (Depetris Chauvin and Kraay, 2005; Johansson,
2008), on credit availability to the private sector (Harrabi, Bousrih and Mohammed,
2007) and on social services expenditures (Dessy and Vencatachellum, 2007), finding
a mixed evidence. The main contribution of this paper is to build on this litera-
ture providing further evidence of the consequences of debt forgiveness on different
macroeconomic indicators and on institutional quality2, focusing on a sample of
developing countries and also explicitly on HIPCs, and trying to disentangle possi-
ble heterogeneous effects according to the country-specific institutional framework,
given that a certain level of institutional quality is required in order to benefit from
2Also in this case, the overall CPIA score represents an advantage to evaluate whether debt relief is
actually pushing recipient governments to improve their institutions. Given that debt relief programs and
lending criteria are based on these indicators, we expect debtors to improve their policy and institutional
framework according to the aspects included in the CPIA score.
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debt relief (Asiedu, 2003). In particular, with respect to Depetris Chauvin and
Kraay (2005), who represent the benchmark for this analysis, the paper extends
their analysis looking at the outcomes following debt relief granted at the beginning
of the new millennium. This is of particular interest because those were the years
during which debt relief increased substantially as a result of the HIPC Initiative
and also because it allows for testing whether International Financial Institutions
are learning by previous debt relief and improving its effectiveness over time.
We acknowledge that this represents a tentative evaluation of debt relief ef-
fectiveness and that more time and data is certainly required to better establish
whether HIPC relief were able to achieve its targets in terms of poverty reduction
and sustained economic growth, without determining any other side-effect. In par-
ticular, the 100 per cent debt cancelation granted by the MDRI could be more
effective than traditional debt relief in helping countries escaping a situation of aid
dependence (Koeda, 2008). Nevertheless, given the relevance of this issue for policy
makers, we believe that the more data and analysis available at any time, the more
informed could be the decision-making.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the results of the debt relief
programs in terms of debt service reduction and poverty reduction expenditures
and reviews the relevant literature on debt relief effectiveness. Section 3 is about
the data used in the empirical analysis and on their sources. Section 4 looks firstly
at the determinants of debt relief (Section 4.1) and, then, at the effects of debt
relief on different macroeconomic and institutional variables (Section 4.2). Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Effects of Debt Relief in Poor Coun-
tries
2.1 Debt relief delivered . . .
According to the statistics published by the IMF and the World Bank, at September
2008 the committed debt relief under the HIPC Initiative amounted to 68 billions of
US dollars in nominal terms, of which 45 billions delivered to the 23 post-completion
point countries and 23 billions to the 10 interim HIPCs. The MDRI added other
43 billions in assistance for the 23 post-completion point countries, so that, in sum,
HIPC and MDRI assistance amounts to USD 112 billions (International Develop-
ment Association and International Monetary Fund, 2008, Table 4). One the one
hand, this is a large quantity of money which deserves a careful scrutiny about
its effectiveness in fostering poverty reduction in recipient countries. On the other
hand, expectations on the results of debt relief should be realistic. To put these fig-
ures in perspective, one should consider that the estimated total cost of supporting
the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) financing gap in all countries is around
$121 billion in 2006, raising to $189 billion in 2015 (UN Millennium Project, 2005),
while official development assistance (ODA) was equal to USD 103.7 billion in 2007
(95 billion without considering debt relief) (OECD, 2008).
In particular, at country level, the UN Millennium Project estimates that Uganda
needs USD 33 billion to meet the MDGs over the period 2005-2015, which amounts,
on average, to 90 dollars per capita and to the 26 per cent of GDP per year. Of
this sum, 17 billions (13.7% of GDP) have to be financed through external budget
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support. The costs of funding the MDGs represent a similar share of GDP also in
Ghana (26.3%) and Tanzania (27.7%) where the external budget support should
be equal, respectively, to 15.6 and 16.6 per cent of GDP Sachs et al. (2004). By
contrast, at September 2008, these countries received debt relief under the HIPC
and MDRI programs only for a small share of their expected expenditures3.
2.2 . . . and some results
This section discusses the effects of debt forgiveness in poor countries. Firstly, we
inspect the official data to see whether debt relief actually freed up resources in
the budget balance and whether these money was targeted to increasing pro-poor
spending (subsection 2.2.1). However, more resources and more expenditures on
poverty reduction are not a sufficient conditions for granting poverty reduction and,
more generally, improvements in the economic performance. Hence, in subsection
2.2.2 we review the most relevant literature on debt relief effectiveness, focusing on
its consequences on social spending and economic performance.
2.2.1 More resources
A first result of debt relief is the relaxing of budget balance, with HIPC countries
reducing the share of debt service over GDP (and revenues). According to official
World Bank data, from 1999 to 2007, debt service in the 33 post-decision point
HIPCs decreases from 22 to 8 per cent of revenues and from 3.9 to 1.5 per cent of
GDP. This trend is projected to continue in the next years when the ratio of debt
service over GDP is going to be below one per cent (Figure 2).
Given the design of the HIPC Initiative, which strengthens the links between
debt relief and poverty-reduction efforts, the savings from debt service payments
should pay for increases in poverty reduction expenditures. In fact, poverty reduc-
tion expenditures have increased from 34.7 per cent of government revenues in 1999
to 50 per cent in 2005 and they are projected to raise above this threshold in the
next years. As a share of GDP, pro-poor spending is estimated to pass form 7 per
cent in 1999 to almost 10 per cent in 2012 (Figure 2).
Notwithstanding this positive aggregate picture, the situation at country level
is more heterogeneous, with countries that still face harsh financing constraints and
have limited poverty-reducing expenditures, as showed by Figure 3. In particular, in
the Republic of Congo and Guinea-Bissau more than 8% of GDP had to be allocated
to service external debt in 2007. The situation is also critical in the Gambia, where
debt service was 4.1% of GDP and in Guinea, Bolivia and Sao Tome and Principe,
where expenditures for debt service were above two per cent of GDP. Moreover,
notwithstanding an average reduction in debt service payments after decision point,
the variability across countries increased substantially (the coefficient of variation
increased from 0.64 at decision point to 1.35 in 2007).
The opposite happened with respect to pro-poor spending, which, apart from
increasing on average, became more equally diffused across countries (the coefficient
3In particular, debt relief for Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda totaled respectively USD 7.4, 6.8 and 5.5
billion (International Development Association and International Monetary Fund, 2008). Moreover, over
the period 1988-2003, those countries received, on average per year, debt relief in present value terms
(our calculation based on data by Depetris Chauvin and Kraay, 2005), ranging from 1.1 to 6.4 dollars
per capita and from 0.3 to 2.9 of their GDP.
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Figure 2: Debt Service and Poverty Reduction Expenditures in HIPCs
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Source: International Development Association and International Monetary Fund (2008, Table 1). Data refers to the 33
post-decision point HIPCs. The ratios for 2007 are preliminary, while from 2008 onwards are projections.
of variation decreased from 0.65 at decision point to 0.45 in 2007). Nevertheless,
even in this case, there are some countries which are left behind, such as Sierra
Leone, Guinea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Benin and Guinea-Bissau which
allocate less than five per cent of GDP on poverty reduction spending.
In sum, while the progress in debt service reduction, even if at different pace, are
common to almost all countries (with the exception of Guinea-Bissau), five coun-
tries experienced a reduction in the share of GDP allocated to poverty reduction
expenditures.
Finally, data on poverty reduction expenditures provide a first descriptive ev-
idence of the importance of the policy and institutional framework in recipient
countries in order to reap the benefit of debt relief (Asiedu, 2003). Countries with
better policies were more able, on average, to target resources freed up by debt
relief to poverty reduction spending and there is a positive correlation between the
change in pro-poor spending between decision point and 2007 and the initial qual-
ity of the policy and institutional framework, measured by the overall CPIA score
(Figure 4)4. .
4See Section 3 for detailed information on the data used.
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Figure 3: Debt Service and Poverty Reduction Expenditures in selected HIPCs
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2.2.2 The outcomes
The first contribution which directly assesses the impact of debt relief on growth,
investment and public spending is provided by Depetris Chauvin and Kraay (2005),
who construct two alternative measures of the total amount of debt relief (in present
value) over the period 1989-2003, one based on debtor- and the other on creditor-
reported data. As stated by the authors themselves, their results on 62 low-income
countries are rather disappointing, given that they found a very limited evidence
supporting a positive impact on public and social (health and education) spend-
ing, investment and growth rates. Furthermore, there is only a weak evidence of
additionality of debt relief with countries receiving more debt relief experiencing
subsequent decline in aid inflows. Finally, there is a positive association between
reduction in debt and future increases in policy and institutional indexes, even if it
is driven by few outliers. While Depetris Chauvin and Kraay rely on a difference-
in-difference estimator to assess the impact of debt relief on a number of possible
outcomes, Johansson (2008) uses a dynamic panel model to estimate a growth and
an investment equation, confirming the ineffectiveness of debt relief in enhancing
investment and growth.
Building on the Depetris Chauvin and Kraay’ paper, other authors have inves-
tigated the effectiveness of debt relief, focusing on African countries. Dessy and
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Figure 4: Poverty Reduction Expenditures and Institutional Quality in HIPCs
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Vencatachellum (2007) analyze the relationship between debt relief and social ex-
penditures5 in Africa, finding that debt reduction is associated with an increase
in the the share of country’s expenditures allocated either to public education or
health in countries which have improved their institutions. In a recent paper, Cre-
spo Cuaresma and Vincelette (2008) look at education outcomes in countries that
reached the decision and completion points under the HIPC Initiative finding mixed
evidence. Comparing HIPC countries at different stage of the Initiative, the au-
thors find that drop out rates decrease after a country graduates from completion
point, while they do not find any significant increase in educational expenditures.
A further channel through which debt relief could benefit recipient countries
could be the relaxing of financing constraints for local firms. In fact, large exter-
nal debt is detrimental for private sector lending because of higher interest rates
and high risk premium associated with debt overhang. Furthermore, government
could recur to internal financing to serve external debt obligations, leading to the
crowding out of private sector investment because of the preference of the banking
system towards government securitized debt. The latter point is confirmed by the
5More generally, Lora and Olivera (2007) looks at the relationship between external debt and social
expenditures. Their results on a panel of 50 developing countries show that higher total public debt is
associated with a reduction in social expenditures, while debt service payments has a limited effect.
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analysis of Arnone and Presbitero (2007) who show how domestic debt is rising
in many HIPCs as an unintended consequence of the Initiative and find that the
investor base is very concentrated, with the banking sector being the main holder
of government securities (the banking systems held around 60% of government se-
curities in 2002 in a sample of HIPCs). The real effect of a rising domestic debt on
private sector lending is supported by Christensen (2005), who documents that, in
a sample of African countries, a rising domestic debt reduces banking credit to the
private sector. Hence, Harrabi, Bousrih and Mohammed (2007) test the hypothesis
that debt relief, creating fiscal space and limiting increasing in the interest rates,
could enhance credit to the private sector. The authors look at the experience of
52 African countries over the period 1988-2004 and find that debt relief actually al-
leviates government pressure on domestic financial markets. Moreover, in the long
term, debt relief reduces the crowding out effect only when associated with good
institutional quality.
3 Data
We build a dataset covering 62 developing (low and lower-middle income) countries
over the period 1988-2007 merging macroeconomic data drawn from the World
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2008) with other datasets for debt relief,
external and domestic debt, and institutional indicators6.
The historical series on the Net Present Value (NPV) of Public and Public-
Guaranteed external debt is an internal dataset of The World Bank constructed by
Dikhanov (2004). From these data, a measure of external debt burden is constructed
scaling the NPV of external debt over GDP (EXTERNAL DEBT )7. Data on
domestic debt (scaled by GDP, DomD) comes from the dataset built by Abbas
(2007), on the basis of the IFS monetary surveys, for 93 low income countries
spanning the period 1974-20048.
Data on debt relief comes from the dataset developed by Depetris Chauvin and
Kraay (2005). These authors estimate the net change in the net present value of the
stock of debt outstanding due to debt relief. With respect to the traditional data
on the nominal amount of debt forgiven, this measure has the double advantage of
considering adequately the changes in external debt due to reschedulings and the
actual variation in the net present value of debt due to cancelation of concessional
debt. Moreover, Depetris Chauvin and Kraay build two alternative measures of
debt relief, one based on debtor-reported data and the other on creditor-reported
6The country coverage is based on the 1988 World Bank income classification, in order to avoid sample
selection problems, and varies according to different exercises because of data availability. The list of
countries, together with their regional and income classification, is reported in Table 8 in Appendix A
7Alternatively, the ratio of external debt over exports could be more informative on a country’s
capacity to generate enough foreign currency to meet its debt obligations. However, in this paper we
need a measure of debt burden and the ratio of external debt over GDP is a good proxy and suffer
less form the volatility of the denominator. Moreover, as shown in Figure 1, the two indicators provide
similar pictures.
8More formally, Abbas (2007, p.18) define the public sector domestic debt as gross securitised claims
on the central government (excluding the stock of treasury securities issued by the central bank) plus all
securities issued by the central bank and appearing on the liabilities side of its balance sheet. The author
also reports the series of domestic debt scaled by GDP and commercial bank deposits.
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data9. Given the high correlation between the two measures (0.66) and the under-
estimation of the creditor-based measure of debt relief, since it includes only the
major creditors, throughout the paper we present results obtained with the debtor-
based measure of debt relief, scaled by the initial stock of the net present value of
external debt (DEBT RELIEF )10.
The quality of policies and institutions is measured by the Country Policy and
Institutional Assessments (CPIA) indicator, which is developed by the World Bank,
reflecting the its staff professional judgment, based on country knowledge, policy
dialogue, and relevant public available indicators (for more information, see Interna-
tional Development Association, 2007)11. Moreover, we also measure institutional
quality using the World Governance Indicators developed by the World Bank, which
have the advantage of being available also for 200712 and cover different aspect of
governance which could affect and be affected in a different way debt forgiveness:
voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi,
2008).
4 Results
This section firstly looks at the determinants of debt relief (subsection 4.1). The
aims are to (1) identify the variables affecting the donors’ choice to granting debt
relief and the amount of debt actually forgiven and (2) assess whether donors are
moving towards an increasing selectivity based on institutional quality. Then, we
present the empirical evidence on the effects of debt relief on different macroeco-
nomic indicators (subsection 4.2). Given that we are interested in any change in the
effectiveness of debt relief or in donors’ behavior in both the exercises the analysis
focuses on different sub-periods, apart from looking at the whole time period.
4.1 The Determinants of Debt Relief
It is generally argued that debt forgiveness should act as an incentive to recipient
countries to improve their institutions and to undergo adjustments leading to better
policies. Traditional conditionality is based on an ex-ante commitment by debtor
governments, but it suffers from a number of shortcomings, since the imperfect
monitoring by donors creates an incentive for moral hazard behavior by recipient
governments. Moreover, a large number of conditions attached to aid disbursements
or to debt relief is perceived as intrusive in national sovereignty and it is likely to
reduce the country ownership of reform programmes (Drazen, 2002). The standard
policy conditionality is concerned about making government accountable to donors
9See the Appendix of the Depetris Chauvin and Kraay (2005)’s paper for further detail on the con-
struction of these two measures.
10For robustness, we have repeated all the exercises with the creditor-based measure. Results are
available from the author on request.
11This data are now fully disclosed and published in the World Development Indicators World Bank
(2008) starting from 2005, but the historical dataset is confidential. The dataset used in the paper covers
the period from 1987 to 2006
12This gives one year more of time to evaluate debt relief effectiveness, even if at the cost reducing the
sample period from 1996 onwards.
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and, in this way, it undermines the accountability of the government to the soci-
ety. Donors could reinforce the accountability of the government to their citizens
following an alternative strategy rewarding ex-post the countries that meet criteria
of attained level of governance and that demonstrated to be able to achieve signif-
icant improvements in their policies and institutional framework (the governance
conditionality proposed by Collier, 2007).
Given the large cost of debt relief it is worth analyzing the behavior of donors in
order to assess whether they were able to allocate resources to virtuous countries,
adopting the ex-post governance conditionality, at least in the last years. To do so,
we look at the determinants of debt relief, building on a literature which generally
found that, in the past, debt forgiveness was not granted to countries with good
governance (Neumayer, 2002), even if, since 2000, debt relief programs seem to
be influenced by recipients’ institutional quality (Freytag and Pehnelt, 2008). In
particular, Neumayer (2002) find that debt forgiveness is mainly driven by countries’
need. Estimating a two-stage model and using a number of governance indicators,
the author shows that, in a cross-section of 85 developing countries, there is only a
statistical (but modest) association between the degree of voice and accountability
and regulatory burden of recipient governments and the amount of debt forgiven
over the period 1989-1998. Using more recent data for 123 developing countries from
1990 to 2004, Freytag and Pehnelt (2008) point out a change in donors’ behavior,
which passed from being driven by “political rationality” in the nineties to be
shaped by “economical rationality” in the new millennium. Specifically, the change
in the rule of law and in government effectiveness are positively associated with the
amount of debt relief in 2000-2004, while institutional and policy variables do not
appear to influence the probability of being eligible for debt forgiveness, as found
also by Neumayer (2002).
4.1.1 Descriptive Evidence
Amongst the possible determinants of debt relief it is worth assessing the impact
of the institutional framework. The data available allows for inspecting the rela-
tionship between the probability of receiving debt relief in three different periods
(1992-1995, 1996-1999 and 2000-2003) and the quality of policies and institutions
in the previous period. The univariate analysis suggests a selective behavior by
donors, which seem to target debt relief to countries with better institutions. Table
1 points out a significant difference in the overall CPIA score between countries
which received debt relief and those which not in all periods except from debt relief
granted between 1996 and 1999.
A similar indication can be drawn also from the inspection of the relationship
between debt relief and past institutions, limited to countries which actually had a
share of their external debt forgiven (Figure 5). Interestingly, the lack of any statis-
tical correlation between debt relief and past institutions is a result of a completely
opposite pattern over time. In fact, in both samples there is a negative correlation
between the logarithm of debt relief and the past level of the overall CPIA score
in the first period. However, this relationship becomes positive starting from 1996,
suggesting that the HIPC Initiative was probably successful in influencing donors
towards a lending strategy aimed at rewarding countries with better institutions
and policies.
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Table 1: Debt Relief and Institutions
Periods (t) No debt relief Debt relief t-test
CPIAt−1 Obs. CPIAt−1 Obs. (p-value)
1992-1995 2.78 17 3.28 38 0.04
1996-1999 2.98 20 3.16 41 0.22
2000-2003 2.93 19 3.24 42 0.07
Total 2.90 56 3.22 121 0.01
Notes: The table reports the average values of the overall CPIA score in the period t-1 for countries which received or not
debt relief at time t. The last column report the p-values for the one-tailed test of the null hypothesis that the values of
the CPIA scores in countries which received debt relief are higher than in countries without debt relief.
4.1.2 Multivariate Analysis
Using the dataset described in Section 3 it is possible to identify which are the
factors determining the choice of granting debt relief and also affecting the amount
of debt forgiven. The decision of granting debt relief could be thought as a two-
step process, in which the first step consists in selecting the eligible countries and
the second one concerns the amount of external debt actually forgiven. Hence,
the whole process could be modeled using the two-step estimator developed by
Heckman (1979). Specifically, in the selection equation the dependent variable is
the probability of a country i receiving a positive amount of debt relief at time t :
Pr(DEBT RELIEFi,t) = Φ(DEBT RELIEFi,t−1, CPIAi,t−1, AIDi,t−1, GDPi,t−1,
DEBT SERV ICEi,t−1, EXTERNAL DEBTi,t−1, HIPCi, COLONYi, Dt) (1)
where Φ is the normal distribution function. The possible determinants of the
probability of receiving debt relief refer to time t-1 and include the logarithm of the
amount of debt relief already received in the previous period(DEBT RELIEF ),
the logarithm of aid inflows (as a share of GDP, AID), the logarithm of real
GDP per capita (GDP ), the logarithm of total debt service (as a share of GDP,
DEBT SERV ICE), the logarithm of the Net Present Value of external debt over
GDP (EXTERNAL DEBT ), the overall CPIA score (CPIA), a dummy for HIPC
countries (HIPC), and the number of years the country has been a former colony of
an OECD country since 1900 (COLONY , from the World Factbook (Central Intel-
ligence Agency, 2008)), to take into account political interest driving aid allocation
by donors, which might want to preserve an influence on recipient countries13.
The outcome equation expresses the amount of debt relief as a function of past
levels of aid, total debt service and external debt (all expressed as the logarithms
of their ratios over GDP) and of the level of the overall CPIA score in the previous
period:
13The same measure is used, amongst others, by Alesina and Dollar (2000). To control also for geo-
political motivations in donors’ behavior, in separate regressions we have also included the log of the
minimum kilometric distance between the capital of the indebted country and either New York, Tokio
or Rotterdam (the variable is taken from Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999)). Our main findings are
confirmed, even if the sample size is further reduced because of data availability.
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ln(DEBT RELIEFi,t) = α+ β1CPIAi,t−1 + β2AIDi,t−1 +
+β3DEBT SERV ICEi,t−1 + β4EXTERNAL DEBTi,t−1 +Dt + λˆi (2)
where time dummies (Dt) and the inverse Mills ratio estimated in equation 1
(λˆi) are included. Therefore, the excluding restrictions which are likely to affect
the probability of receiving debt forgiveness but not its amount are the real per
capita GDP, the amount of debt relief in the previous period, the past colonial
experience and a dummy for HIPCs. For the latter variable, we follow Freytag and
Pehnelt (2008), while COLONY is included to taken into account possible political
motivation in the allocation of debt relief (similarly, Neumayer (2002), who does not
find past colonial experience being correlated with the amount of debt forgiven) and
the other two variables are generally significantly correlated with the probability of
receiving debt relief, but not with the quantity of debt forgiven.
Table 2 reports the results for the pooled cross sections over the whole period
1998-2003 as well as for the three sub-periods for the whole sample of developing
countries. As regard the selection equation, results show that donors are more likely
to grant debt reductions to the HIPC countries and to those that already received
debt relief, supporting the hypothesis of the presence of path dependence in debt
relief (Michaelowa, 2003). However, the level of indebtedness, both in terms of
stocks and flows, and the level of income are not a significant determinants of the
likelihood of receiving debt relief. The result about the lack of significance of debt
variables is not due to the presence of the dummy for HIPCs, since its exclusion
does not turns the coefficient on external debt and debt service significant. Hence,
once controlled for being HIPC and for past debt relief, there is no evidence of
donors targeting more indebted and poorer countries. The number of years as
former colony does not influence the probability of having debt forgiven14. Finally,
as concerns the variable of interest, the overall CPIA score is significant at five per
cent level only in the last period: since 2000 donors seem to reward countries with
good policies and institutions granting them debt relief.
Turning to the outcome equation, the picture is quite different. In this case,
in fact, the larger the stock of external debt in present value terms, the greater
the amount of debt canceled in the subsequent period. Debt service payments
enter in the equation with a negative and significant sign. Even if, at first glance,
this result could appear contrary to expectations, it is fully consistent with the
hypothesis of debt relief at least partially concerning debt which were not being
serviced. In other words, donors grant debt relief to countries which are most
in need and with lower probability of repayment. Aid inflows are also negatively
correlated with subsequent debt relief, which is still consistent with a targeting of
debt relief towards countries most in need and with low repayment capacity. Finally,
the analysis of the coefficients of the overall CPIA score shows a very interesting
finding, which is consistent with the descriptive evidence (Figure 5). Even if there
is a general positive association between institutional quality and debt reduction,
this correlation substantially increases over time. Hence, results suggest a change
14This result could be driven by the aggregation of data, since political interest could better identified
with bilateral flows (Alesina and Weder, 2002), instead of looking at the total amount of external debt
forgiven, which involve also multilateral creditors.
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Table 2: Determinants of Debt Relief, Whole Sample
1992-2003 1992-1995 1996-1999 2000-2003
Outcome equation: Dep. Var.: DEBT RELIEFt
CPIAt−1 0.459*** 0.022 0.472* 0.878***
(0.154) (0.252) (0.252) (0.239)
AIDt−1 -0.531** -0.350 -0.792** -0.065
(0.267) (0.487) (0.384) (0.389)
DEBT SERV ICEt−1 -0.448*** 0.033 -0.046 -1.084***
(0.173) (0.307) (0.315) (0.201)
EXTERNAL DEBTt−1 0.629*** -0.000 0.761*** 1.032***
(0.159) (0.283) (0.258) (0.234)
Selection equation: Dep. Var.: Pr(DEBT RELIEFt) > 0
HIPC(0, 1) 1.152*** 1.289* 1.044 0.905
(0.330) (0.678) (0.676) (0.609)
COLONY -0.000 -0.009 -0.000 0.009
(0.005) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
ln(DEBT RELIEFt−1) 0.534*** 0.779*** 0.617*** 0.482**
(0.112) (0.255) (0.216) (0.234)
CPIAt−1 0.144 -0.298 0.146 1.106**
(0.202) (0.358) (0.388) (0.473)
AIDt−1 -0.044 0.264 -0.288 0.486
(0.354) (0.693) (0.605) (0.855)
DEBT SERV ICEt−1 0.067 -0.081 0.084 0.458
(0.278) (0.554) (0.494) (0.529)
GDPt−1 0.169 0.004 0.614 -0.680
(0.278) (0.552) (0.575) (0.581)
EXTERNAL DEBTt−1 0.267 0.322 0.192 0.480
(0.213) (0.452) (0.368) (0.465)
λˆ 0.152 -0.124 0.727*** 0.156
(0.220) (0.450) (0.281) (0.295)
Observations 161 50 53 58
Censored 76 24 25 27
Notes: The table reports regression coefficients and, in brackets, the associated standard errors. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The model is estimated by Two-Step Heckman, using Stata 10 SE package with
HECKMAN command. Time dummies (in the first column) and the constant are included.
in donors behavior which, in correspondence of the start of the HIPC Initiative,
are choosing the eligible countries and the amount of debt relief on the basis of the
quality of policies and institutions, rewarding the countries with better governance.
Table 3 reports the results for the sub-sample of HIPCs. Even if the limited the
sample size could widen standards errors and make the estimates less reliable, it
is worth assessing whether the main findings are confirmed for the HIPCs or not.
Given the great effort undertaken by the international community to implement the
HIPC Initiative and the emphasis on poverty reduction and institutional quality it
would be reasonable to expect HIPC relief targeting countries more in need and
better governed. In fact, we find that the choice of forgiving debt is path dependent
and debt relief is targeted to the countries most in need and with low repayment
capacity. With respect to any change in donor’s behavior in HIPCs, we find that
since 2000 both the choice of granting debt relief and its amount depends on the
policy and institutional framework. All in all, results are consistent with a more
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Table 3: Determinants of Debt Relief, HIPC Sample
1992-2003 1992-1995 1996-1999 2000-2003
Outcome equation: Dep. Var.: DEBT RELIEFt
CPIAt−1 0.252 0.024 0.252 0.947*
(0.157) (0.201) (0.259) (0.554)
AIDt−1 -0.433 -0.367 -0.352 -0.123
(0.271) (0.470) (0.444) (0.431)
DEBT SERV ICEt−1 -0.455*** -0.181 -0.307 -1.202***
(0.175) (0.238) (0.304) (0.362)
EXTERNAL DEBTt−1 0.635*** 0.210 0.889*** 1.051***
(0.155) (0.241) (0.291) (0.343)
Selection equation: Dep. Var.: Pr(DEBT RELIEFt) > 0
COLONY -0.002 -0.007 -0.008 0.012
(0.007) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
ln(DEBT RELIEFt−1) 0.736*** 0.607** 1.158*** 0.304
(0.163) (0.281) (0.387) (0.447)
CPIAt−1 -0.171 -0.412 -0.441 2.794**
(0.288) (0.424) (0.745) (1.416)
AIDt−1 -0.196 0.483 -0.628 -0.719
(0.517) (1.019) (0.959) (1.391)
DEBT SERV ICEt−1 0.589 0.164 1.339 -0.391
(0.398) (0.585) (1.175) (1.091)
GDPt−1 -0.368 0.111 -1.079 -1.253
(0.358) (0.611) (1.032) (0.790)
EXTERNAL DEBTt−1 -0.020 -0.076 -0.240 1.305
(0.277) (0.562) (0.612) (0.965)
λˆ -0.297 0.057 -0.167 0.131
(0.271) (0.368) (0.382) (0.653)
Observations 108 36 35 37
Censored 32 12 10 10
Notes: The table reports regression coefficients and, in brackets, the associated standard errors. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The model is estimated by Two-Step Heckman, using Stata 10 SE package with
HECKMAN command. Time dummies (in the first column) and the constant are included.
recent selective approach by donors and also with a better targeting on poorer
countries.
Finally, Tables 4 and 5 report the estimation of equations 1 and 2 for the
debt relief granted in period 2000-2003, substituting the overall CPIA score with
the World Governance Indicators, in order to see which aspect of institutional
governance matters for debt forgiveness. Differently, from the CPIA score, in the
whole sample none of the governance indicators affect the probability of debt relief,
while all but “control of corruption” are positively associated with larger amount of
debt forgiven (Table 4). Besides, the quality of bureaucracy and of public service
provision, as well as the ability of the government to formulate and implement
sound policies and regulations are the aspects of governance which matter most in
the allocation of debt relief. These effects almost vanish in the subset of HIPCs,
where only differences in the implementation of sound policies and in the regulations
to promote private sector development positively affect the amount of debt relief
(Table 5)
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Table 4: Determinants of Debt Relief, Whole Sample, 2000-2003
Corruption Government Regulation Rule of law Stability Voice
Outcome equation: Dep. Var.: DEBT RELIEFt
GOV ERNANCEt−1 0.306 1.036*** 0.791*** 0.620** 0.429*** 0.413*
(0.350) (0.311) (0.220) (0.303) (0.148) (0.226)
AIDt−1 0.333 0.108 0.078 0.223 0.155 0.077
(0.471) (0.408) (0.418) (0.449) (0.425) (0.487)
DEBT SERV ICEt−1 -0.855*** -1.134*** -1.114*** -1.024*** -0.992*** -0.896***
(0.263) (0.230) (0.239) (0.258) (0.232) (0.249)
EXTERNAL DEBTt−1 0.644** 0.890*** 0.957*** 0.859*** 0.756*** 0.677***
(0.258) (0.227) (0.227) (0.269) (0.220) (0.234)
Selection equation: Dep. Var.: Pr(DEBT RELIEFt) > 0
HIPC 1.008* 1.078* 1.027* 1.013* 1.009* 0.988*
(0.566) (0.579) (0.577) (0.567) (0.566) (0.575)
COLONY 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
DEBT RELIEFt−1 0.455** 0.483** 0.478** 0.468** 0.467** 0.455**
(0.200) (0.207) (0.211) (0.202) (0.199) (0.198)
GOV ERNANCEt−1 0.320 0.840 -0.118 0.433 0.166 0.068
(0.532) (0.637) (0.483) (0.551) (0.288) (0.438)
AIDt−1 0.563 0.564 0.758 0.619 0.607 0.691
(0.808) (0.785) (0.785) (0.771) (0.798) (0.806)
DEBT SERV ICEt−1 0.774 0.588 0.898* 0.655 0.796* 0.828*
(0.489) (0.518) (0.518) (0.530) (0.482) (0.491)
GDPt−1 -0.439 -0.522 -0.380 -0.403 -0.476 -0.415
(0.482) (0.511) (0.487) (0.485) (0.499) (0.483)
EXTERNAL DEBTt−1 -0.023 0.098 -0.190 0.064 -0.071 -0.116
(0.378) (0.381) (0.403) (0.419) (0.347) (0.344)
λˆ 0.176 0.129 0.386 0.088 0.057 0.218
(0.334) (0.283) (0.283) (0.323) (0.304) (0.326)
Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58
Censored 27 27 27 27 27 27
Notes: The table reports regression coefficients and, in brackets, the associated standard errors. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. GOV ERNANCE refer to the six World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay
and Mastruzzi, 2008) reported at the top of each column. The model is estimated by Two-Step Heckman, using Stata 10
SE package with HECKMAN command.
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Table 5: Determinants of Debt Relief, HIPC Sample, 2000-2003
Corruption Government Regulation Rule of law Stability Voice
Outcome equation: Dep. Var.: DEBT RELIEFt
GOV ERNANCEt−1 -0.171 0.723* 0.684** 0.111 0.183 0.231
(0.395) (0.407) (0.267) (0.368) (0.194) (0.247)
AIDt−1 0.123 -0.058 -0.220 0.019 0.017 -0.121
(0.500) (0.467) (0.472) (0.511) (0.490) (0.505)
DEBT SERV ICEt−1 -0.593* -0.984*** -1.132*** -0.762** -0.821*** -0.827***
(0.318) (0.299) (0.331) (0.338) (0.313) (0.301)
EXTERNAL DEBTt−1 0.555** 0.845*** 0.990*** 0.689** 0.707*** 0.698***
(0.269) (0.249) (0.267) (0.295) (0.250) (0.244)
Selection equation: Dep. Var.: Pr(DEBT RELIEFt) > 0
COLONY 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
DEBT RELIEFt−1 0.631* 0.566* 0.668* 0.600* 0.589* 0.555*
(0.346) (0.328) (0.373) (0.331) (0.324) (0.319)
GOV ERNANCEt−1 0.710 1.166 -0.351 0.451 0.235 0.595
(0.888) (1.051) (0.732) (0.837) (0.400) (0.667)
AIDt−1 -0.187 0.046 0.343 0.156 0.075 -0.137
(1.207) (1.140) (1.155) (1.094) (1.134) (1.208)
DEBT SERV ICEt−1 1.189 0.940 1.572* 1.134 1.337* 1.317*
(0.726) (0.812) (0.804) (0.849) (0.717) (0.725)
GDPt−1 -1.053 -1.052 -0.915 -0.939 -1.096 -1.120
(0.676) (0.665) (0.672) (0.655) (0.701) (0.688)
EXTERNAL DEBTt−1 0.029 0.114 -0.466 -0.045 -0.165 -0.135
(0.565) (0.546) (0.582) (0.589) (0.443) (0.454)
λˆ -0.353 -0.142 -0.089 -0.434 -0.341 -0.446
(0.596) (0.596) (0.530) (0.604) (0.580) (0.581)
Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37
Censored 10 10 10 10 10 10
Notes: The table reports regression coefficients and, in brackets, the associated standard errors. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. GOV ERNANCE refer to the six World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay
and Mastruzzi, 2008) reported at the top of each column. The model is estimated by Two-Step Heckman, using Stata 10
SE package with HECKMAN command.
19
4.2 Debt Relief Effectiveness
In the previous section we have addressed one side of the relationship between debt
relief and institution building, finding that, starting since 2000, donors started tar-
geting debt forgiveness to countries with better policies and institutions. However,
the main question we are interested in is debt relief effectiveness. This section aims
at assessing the impact of debt relief on different outcomes and the eventual im-
provements due to a sort of learning by doing and to a targeting towards better
governed countries.
4.2.1 Descriptive Evidence
A very simple way to inspect the effectiveness of debt relief consists in the visual
representation of the correlation between actual debt relief and subsequent changes
in different macroeconomic outcomes. In particular, we wash out business cycle
fluctuations averaging data over four non-overlapping five years periods (1988-91;
1992-95; 1996-99; 2000-03; 2004-07) and we measure the change in outcome Y as
the difference Yt − Yt−1, while the corresponding debt relief measure refers to the
period t− 1 and it is divided by the initial stock of external debt (measured in Net
Present Value in the year before the four years period).
Amongst the possible variables which could be affected by debt relief, we con-
sider the following ones in order to test some simple hypothesis:
1. The real growth rate of GDP per capita (GROWTH), calculated as log differ-
ence of the per capita GDP, measured in purchasing power parity at constant
international dollars. This first exercise aims at unraveling any direct rela-
tionship between debt relief and subsequent growth.
2. The investment rate (INV ), calculated as the share of gross capital formation
over GDP, to test for the presence of debt overhang.
3. The ratio of foreign direct investments over GDP (FDI), to evaluate whether
debt reduction is perceived as a positive signal by the international community,
so that private investors increase their presence in the country.
4. The ratio of domestic debt over GDP (DomD). In this case, the testable
hypothesis is based on an unintended consequence of the HIPC Initiative,
based on the asymmetric adjustment of the real and monetary sides of the
economy, which is likely to determine an increase in domestic borrowing.
5. The quality of policies and institutions measured, alternatively, by the overall
Country Policy and Institutional Assessments score (CPIA) and by the six
World Governance Indicators, to assess whether debt relief goes hand in hand
with improvements in the institutional framework.
Figures 6 to 11 plots the correlation between actual debt relief and subsequent
changes in the above variables in the whole sample and also in the HIPC countries15.
The diagrams reported in Figure 6 show that there is a positive association
between the amount of debt forgiven and subsequent changes in GDP growth in
15For the last period (2004-2007) data availability on GROWTH, CPIA and FDI exclude 2007, while
for DomD and there is only the observation in 2004. Hence, results on this sub-period are to be taken
with caution and, at least, as preliminary. More reliable are the results on the WGI which, however, can
not be extended backwards before 2000.
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HIPCs (right panel), while the relationship is weaker in the whole sample (left
panel). The investment rate, instead, does not seem to react to previous debt relief
both in the whole sample and in the HIPCs subset (Figure 7). Taken together, these
diagrams suggest that, in HIPCs, there is a negative correlation between external
debt and economic growth, even if this adverse effect works seems not to be due
to a lower capital accumulation, but to a slowdown of total factor productivity,
consistent with the findings of Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci (2004) and Presbitero
(2006).
Figure 8 shows that debt relief did not enhance FDI neither in the whole sample
nor in HIPCs. This result could be explained by the fact that part of debt actually
canceled was already discounted as debt which would have never been serviced.
Hence, foreign investors do not modify their expectations on debtors’ future growth
prospect and do not change their investment strategy because of a formal debt
relief agreement. Furthermore, and in line with this possible explanation, debt
relief might be interpreted by investors as a signal for countries that, given their
large external debt, are likely to have a high (and stable over time) discount rate
against the future: this would mean that governments will keep on overborrowing
and trading off consumption today versus consumption tomorrow, heavily taxing
the private sector and discouraging investors (Easterly, 2002).
The diagram reported in the right panel of Figure 9 confirms the hypothesis
discussed by Arnone and Presbitero (2007), who documented a significant increase
in domestic debt in a number of HIPC countries16. Especially between 2000 and
2003 it is possible to observe a strong and positive correlation between the amount
of debt forgiven and the subsequent increase in domestic debt as a share of GDP17.
According to Arnone and Presbitero (2007), the increase in internal financing is
mainly due the asymmetric adjustment process implied by the HIPC Initiative,
given that the fiscal variables reacted slower than the the monetary ones. Low rev-
enues and the inherent political difficulties in reducing public spending in countries
where most of the population lives in extreme poverty, together with the lack of
access to international capital markets and adequate inflows of concessional lend-
ing, forced the governments to recur to domestic markets to finance their primary
deficits. The different characteristics of the other low income countries included
in the whole sample, and especially their access to international capital markets
(limited, instead by the HIPC Initiative) could explain the lack of a significant cor-
relation between domestic debt and debt relief showed in the left panel of Figure 9.
As already discussed, the shift from external to domestic financing could also have
adverse effects on the economy, because of its high costs in term of debt service and
also because of a drain of resources from the private to the public sector, which are
likely to crowd out private investments.
Finally, figures 10 and 11 focus on the critical aspect of institution building.
Given the large number of conditions attached to debt reduction programs, one
would expect countries that had a share of their debt forgiven improving their poli-
cies and institutions in the following periods. Nevertheless, the theoretical argument
is not so straightforward, given that aid dependence could undermine institutional
quality by weakening accountability, instigating conflict and corruption over control
of resources, siphoning off scarce talent from the bureaucracy, and postponing the
16More generally, Panizza (2008) shows a recent trend in developing countries, which are substituting
external public debt with domestically issued debt.
17The lack of a positive relationship in the last period could be due to limited data availability.
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reform of inefficient policies and institutions (Knack, 2001; Moss, Pettersson and
van de Walle, 2006). The descriptive analysis confirms the presence of a sort of debt
relief curse, given that, on the whole, there is not any positive correlation between
debt relief and subsequent improvements in the overall CPIA score. Besides, in
the period 2000-2003 there is evidence that the larger the share of outstanding ex-
ternal debt which was forgiven, the worse the performance in terms of polices and
institutions, supporting the evidence on aid discussed by Djankov, Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol (2008). For robustness, Figure 11 measures institutional quality ac-
cording to the six World Governance Indicators provided by Kaufmann, Kraay and
Mastruzzi (2008), focusing only on their changes in the last two periods in response
to debt relief in 1996-99 and 2000-03, because of data availability. These years are
the most interesting, since they cover the raise in debt forgiveness following the
HIPC Initiative. While the indexes of regulatory quality, government effectiveness
and political stability do not show any clear improvements in both periods (with
the correlations being sometimes negative), the picture is quite different for the
indexes of corruption, rule of law and voice and accountability. In this cases it
seems that there was a sort of reversal, with a debt relief curse during the years
2000-03 and, instead, a positive effect of debt relief on institutional reform after
2003. More generally, especially in the HIPC sub-sample, there is a positive pattern
in the correlation between debt relief and subsequent changes in governance, with
the relationship passing from negative to positive or, in some cases, flat. This last
result could be read as a positive signal of learning in the debt relief initiatives: the
strong emphasis given by International Financial Institutions on fighting corrup-
tion and promoting the rule of law and institutional accountability seems to start
having real effects.
4.2.2 Multivariate Analysis
The evidence described in section 4.2.1 points to some positive effect of debt relief on
economic growth and institutional reform, at least in the last years and especially
in HIPCs. However, those indications should be confirmed by a more accurate
analysis. Having five periods, we are able to look at the debt relief effects over
a panel dataset consisting of four intervals (1992-95; 1996-99; 2000-03; 2004-07).
Table 6 reports the coefficient β of this very simple regression for the whole sample
and for HIPCs exclusively:
Yi,t − Yi,t−1 = α+ βDEBT RELIEFt−1 + γDt + i, t (3)
Equation 3 is estimated with the within-group estimator in order to wash
out country-specific fixed-effects which might jointly affect the likelihood and the
amount of debt relief and the variation in Y , where the outcomes are the five
macroeconomic variables discussed above.
In the whole sample of developing countries there is no evidence of any statis-
tical significant correlation between debt relief and subsequent changes in growth,
investment, FDI, institutional quality and domestic debt. Nonetheless, when the
sample is limited to the HIPCs, it turns out that past debt relief is associated with
an increase in domestic debt, suggesting a shift from external towards internal fi-
nancing, and with a worsening of institutional quality, consistently with the debt
relief curse hypothesis.
22
Table 6: The Effects of Debt Relief
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var.: Change in: GROWTH INV FDI DomD CPIA
Whole sample
DEBT RELIEFt−1 0.002 -0.030 0.039 0.041 -0.006
[0.002] [0.060] [0.070] [0.043] [0.004]
Observations 220 221 223 183 230
Number of countries 60 60 60 48 62
HIPC countries
DEBT RELIEFt−1 0.002 0.015 -0.020 0.054** -0.011**
[0.003] [0.056] [0.063] [0.022] [0.005]
Observations 146 143 145 136 152
Number of countries 38 37 38 35 39
Notes: The table reports regression coefficients and, in brackets, the associated standard errors. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The model is estimated by Within Group, using Stata 10 SE package with XTREG
command.
The lack of significance of the coefficient could be due to the fact that the
relationship is likely to change across time, as suggested by the Figures 6 to 11 dis-
cussed in the previous section. Therefore, we estimate Equation 3 allowing for the
coefficient β to change over time, interacting DEBT RELIEFt−1 with the time
dummies Dt. The results are reported in Table 7 for the whole sample (upper panel)
and for the HIPC sub-sample (lower panel) but they do not show any significant
effect of debt relief on the variables of interest, apart from the association between
debt relief and increasing domestic financing and worsening governance in HIPCs in
response to the debt forgiven at the end of the Nineties, consistently with Figures
9 and 10. The lack of significance of any shift from external to internal financing in
the last period could be due to poor data availability (the change in domestic debt
is limited to one year only), while the lack of evidence of a debt relief curse could
be a signal of an increased effectiveness of debt relief in institution building in the
last years, in line with the descriptive results discussed in the previous section. Fur-
thermore, the positive correlation between debt forgiveness and economic growth
in HIPCs vanishes once country fixed effects are taken into account, except that in
the first three years of the Initiative, when also investment increased. From 2000
onwards there is no evidence of debt relief triggering economic growth, consistently
with the recent critical evidence on the presence of debt overhang in HIPCs and
also with the model developed by Koeda (2008), which implies that only a one-time
debt cancelation could help countries escaping a situation of aid dependence.
Finally, we have run to other test for the possibility that the impact of debt
relief is (1) differentiated according to institutional quality and (2) less effective
the larger the amount of foreign aid because of the increased management effort
required to local bureaucrats and of a sort of aid fatigue. To do so, we inter-
acted DEBT RELIEFt−1 with respectively the overall CPIA score in t− 1 and
with AIDt−1. However, the results are generally not significant. The lack of non-
linearities according to policies is consistent with the finding of Depetris Chauvin
and Kraay (2005) but contrary to Harrabi, Bousrih and Mohammed (2007) and
Dessy and Vencatachellum (2007) who document a larger influence of debt relief in
countries with sound institutions and policies.
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Table 7: The Effects of Debt Relief, different sub-periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var.: Change in: GROWTH INV FDI DomD CPIA
Whole sample
1992-95 0.001 0.010 0.165 0.053 -0.002
1996-99 0.012** 0.039 0.014 0.078 0.006
2000-03 -0.001 -0.076 0.025 0.092 -0.013**
2004-07 0.004 -0.023 -0.018 -0.044 -0.001
HIPC countries
1992-95 0.002 0.036 0.306** -0.019 -0.006
1996-99 0.015** 0.219* -0.114 0.062 0.001
2000-03 -0.004 -0.060 -0.085 0.122*** -0.024***
2004-07 0.005 0.014 -0.086 0.011 -0.002
Notes: The table reports regression coefficients and, in brackets, the associated standard errors. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The model is estimated by Within Group, using Stata 10 SE package with XTREG
command.
5 Concluding Remarks
The paper has proposed an ex-post evaluation of debt relief, focusing on the last
years and on the HIPC Initiative in order to assess whether the development of such
a large program by International Financial Institutions changed the effectiveness of
debt relief as well as donors’ lending policies.
We firstly document that, since the start of the HIPC Initiative bilateral and
multilateral donors seem to target debt relief efforts to countries with better institu-
tions and policies, following an ex-post governance conditionality. This is reflected
in a subsequent effectiveness of debt relief in promoting institutional reforms, sug-
gesting that debt relief programs are probably providing the right incentives to
debtors limiting the negative effects of aid dependence on the quality of institu-
tions and on the efficiency of the public sector.
With respect to other possible effects of debt relief, we do not find any influence
on subsequent increases in economic growth, investment and FDI once country
fixed-effect are taken into account, consistent with the absence of any debt overhang
effect. This result could be explained by debt relief concerning a large share of debt
which were not likely to be serviced anyway, so that formal debt relief agreements
do not free many resources for investments and do not change the incentive of
foreign and domestic investors. These findings do not necessarily imply that debt
relief is ineffective: more time might be probably necessary to reap the benefits of
debt forgiveness and, if its effectiveness depends on institutional improvements, we
might expect current debt relief to achieve better results in the next future.
By contrast, we find evidence of a shift from external to internal financing in
HIPCs since the launch of the Initiative. The rising domestic debt is an unintended
consequence of the HIPC Initiative and it is undermining overall debt sustainabil-
ity and pro-poor spending since domestic debt service soaks up a large share of
government revenues. Some of the countries which have low (or declining) poverty
reduction expenditures are also the ones with high o rising domestic debt. Uganda
and Sierra Leone, in example, increased their ratio of domestic debt to GDP from
1.6 and 4.6 of GDP in 1996 to 9.4 and 18.2 in 2004 and, as a result, debt service
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on domestic debt (as a share of GDP) increased from 0.2 and 1.1 per cent to 1.5
and 4.3 per cent. Given debt relief and the high degree of concessionality on new
loans, the amount of money used to serve internal financing in 2004 was around 70
per cent of the total (external and domestic) public debt service and it represented
the actual constraints for government expenditures18.
In conclusion, even if these results have to be taken with caution because more
time and data are required to achieve a more conclusive evaluation of debt relief
programs, the paper raises some concerns on the overall effectiveness of the HIPC
Initiative and of the recent MDRI in achieving their main targets. Advocates of
debt relief explicitly or implicitly assume that large external debts are a drag on
domestic and foreign investment and on economic growth, thus leaving indebted
countries in a poverty trap. However, we do not find a strong evidence of debt
relief triggering investment and economic growth. Besides, aggregate indicators
on HIPCs’ external debt service and pro-poor spending (Figure 2) hide a more
heterogeneous picture in which a number of countries lag behind and can not be
evaluated ceteris paribus, given that HIPC debt relief is generally associated with
rising domestic debt. Finally, one should take into account that the amount of
resources freed by debt forgiveness are far less than the those required for achieving
the Millennium Developing Goals and scale down expectations on a more realistic
level.
18Data on domestic debt are taken from Arnone and Presbitero (2007).
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A Sample
Table 8: Country coverage
Country Code Income Region HIPC Country Code Income Region HIPC
Angola AGO LMIC SSA 0 Lesotho LSO LIC SSA 0
Armenia ARM LMIC ECA 0 Moldova MDA LMIC ECA 0
Azerbaijan AZE LMIC ECA 0 Madagascar MDG LIC SSA 1
Burundi BDI LIC SSA 1 Mali MLI LIC SSA 1
Benin BEN LIC SSA 1 Myanmar MMR LIC EA 0
Burkina Faso BFA LIC SSA 1 Mongolia MNG LMIC EA 0
Bangladesh BGD LIC SA 0 Mozambique MOZ LIC SSA 1
Bolivia BOL LMIC LAC 1 Mauritania MRT LIC SSA 1
Bhutan BTN LIC SA 0 Malawi MWI LIC SSA 1
Central African Rep. CAF LIC SSA 1 Niger NER LIC SSA 1
China CHN LIC EA 0 Nigeria NGA LIC SSA 0
Cote d’Ivoire CIV LMIC SSA 1 Nicaragua NIC LMIC LAC 1
Cameroon CMR LMIC SSA 1 Nepal NPL LIC SA 1
Congo, Rep. COG LMIC SSA 1 Pakistan PAK LIC SA 0
Comoros COM LIC SSA 1 Rwanda RWA LIC SSA 1
Djibouti DJI LMIC MENA 0 Sudan SDN LIC SSA 1
Eritrea ERI LIC SSA 1 Senegal SEN LMIC SSA 1
Ethiopia ETH LIC SSA 1 Sierra Leone SLE LIC SSA 1
Ghana GHA LIC SSA 1 Somalia SOM LIC SSA 1
Guinea GIN LIC SSA 1 Sao Tome & Principe STP LIC SSA 1
Gambia, The GMB LIC SSA 1 Chad TCD LIC SSA 1
Guinea-Bissau GNB LIC SSA 1 Togo TGO LIC SSA 1
Equatorial Guinea GNQ LIC 1 0 Tanzania TZA LIC SSA 1
Guyana GUY LIC LAC 1 Uganda UGA LIC SSA 1
Honduras HND LMIC LAC 1 Ukraine UKR LMIC ECA 0
Haiti HTI LIC LAC 1 Uzbekistan UZB LMIC ECA 0
India IND LIC SA 0 Vietnam VNM LIC EA 0
Kenya KEN LIC SSA 0 Yemen, Rep. YEM LMIC MENA 0
Cambodia KHM LIC EA 0 Congo, Dem. Rep. ZAR LIC SSA 1
Lao PDR LAO LIC EA 0 Zambia ZMB LIC SSA 1
Liberia LBR LIC SSA 1 Zimbabwe ZWE LMIC SSA 0
Notes: The country code, the regional and income categories refer to the World Bank Country Classification in 1988
(http://go.worldbank.org/K2CKM78CC0). ECA: Europe & Central Asia; SSA: Sub–Saharan Africa; SA: South Asia; EAP: East Asia &
Pacific; LAC: Latin America & Caribbean; MENA: North Africa & Middle East. LIC: Low Income Country; LMIC: Lower Middle Income
Country.
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Figure 5: Debt Relief and Past Institutions
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Figure 6: Debt Relief and Subsequent Growth
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Figure 7: Debt Relief and Subsequent Investment
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Figure 8: Debt Relief and Subsequent Foreign Direct Investment
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Figure 9: Debt Relief and Subsequent Domestic Debt
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Figure 10: Debt Relief and the Subsequent Institutional Framework, CPIA
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Figure 11: Debt Relief and the Subsequent Institutional Framework, WGI
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